Winter Outlook
As winter fully sets in across Ukraine, here's what to expect from the next few months.
Winter is here in Boston (finally!). While some of us celebrate with skiing and sledding and some curse the snow and pray for May to come soon, the arrival of winter weather heralds something different for Ukraine.
Early fall 2022 brought major Ukrainian operational successes in Kherson and Kharkiv; however, the front subsequently settled into a generally static configuration. This is not to say the fighting died down; scenes from Bakhmut anytime in the last five months look straight out of a hellish nightmare reminiscent of 1917. This period of relative stalemate partially resulted from a culmination of the Ukrainian offensives and the general exhaustion of the Russian army. However, environmental factors played a major role, as they have in every “operational pause” in this region in WW2, WWI, and in older wars.
The annual fall muddy season (the Russian rasputitsa, meaning “time of disagreeable travel” or the aptly named Ukrainian bezdorizhzhia, meaning “roadlessness”) is particularly intense in Ukraine, with soil that is so saturated with clay, it makes water drainage from rains and melting snow stagnate. Even roads are often impassable; as recently as 2016, 97% of roads in Ukraine were in a poor state, with combat further deteriorating the state of infrastructure.
Mud slows advances, particularly (but not exclusively) for any vehicle without tracks, and results in significant supply and movement issues. Calling it a “fall muddy season,” however, doesn’t paint the full picture - deep mud has persisted into mid-January this year due to abnormally mild conditions, and another similar mud season occurs with the spring thaw.
As the soil finally begins to freeze solid in much of Ukraine, onlookers are predicting significant increases in offensive action in late January through March. While the broader 2023 outlook will be the subject of another post in a week or two, it bears mentioning that this year will likely be decisive.
This past fall, Russia threw some of their freshly mobilized troops into the trenches after a week (or less, in some cases!) of training, leading to a great deal of something adjacent to schadenfreude among Western military commentators. However, well over half seem to have been held back for more intensive training, and rumors of a second mobilization of around 500,000 men swirl constantly.
Russia has also gradually transitioned closer and closer to a wartime economy; how successful or even extensive this economic/industrial mobilization will end up being is very unclear. Putin has ordered 10% increases in pensions and the minimum wage to soften the blow from inflation. However, many early assessments on the impacts of economic mobilization and damage from sanctions appear to have been overblown or perhaps overly optimistic. Alexei Firsov, founder of the think tank Platforma, noted that "so far, there are no signs that the drop in living standards could lead to unrest.”
Ukraine too has been training troops both on their own soil and in western countries with the clear goal of not only improving the quality of their existing units withdrawn from the front but also forming new mobile formations for future offensives. Advisors to President Zelenskyy are confident that obtaining American M1 Abrams and German Leopard 2 tanks will “change the course of the war and give start to its end [...] We will be able to finish the war in a few months.” And while I am often a bit leery of overstating the potential effects of individual weapons systems on an entire industrial war, the new Western systems and training recently announced1 may end up dramatically affecting spring/summer offensives as the Ukrainians work to integrate them. Integration is not a quick process. It may take as many as 3 months before this force would be fully equipped to effectively man these new-to-them technologies and operational concepts. In sum, both combatants are feverishly preparing for the imminent onset of a new campaign season.
Both sides are also, understandably, being very tight-lipped about their plans. The top Ukrainian general, Valery Zaluzhny, recently said in a fascinating interview “may the soldiers in the trenches forgive me; it’s more important to focus on the accumulation of resources right now for the more protracted and heavier battles [in 2023].” It’s unknown to what degree both sides are keeping reserves back, resting and training them for use in later offensives or counteroffensives. Where and when those offensives - from either side - might start is, as they say, all everyone’s talking about these days.
In particular, the area around Melitopol2 - captured in March 2022 and illegally annexed in late September, is undergoing scrutiny as the likely focus of a winter counteroffensive. Melitopol is not particularly large, but was known as the “gateway to the Crimea'' prior to 2014 due to its major highway and rail line junctions. It’s the center of three axes around which the entire Russian southern front revolves, along with Donetsk and the Crimea itself, and is - by far - the most vulnerable.
A successful Ukrainian recapture of Melitopol would split the Russian war effort into two halves; one along the Dniepr River and north of Crimea, and another around Donbas. Russian defenses behind the Dniepr appear to be formidable but are largely designed to defend against an attack from the west over the river itself, not from Melitopol in the east. The Donbas is even more heavily militarized and fortified, and it’s difficult to see a dramatically successful offensive from either side in that region anytime soon, particularly with recent Russian offensives around Bakhmut and recently captured Soledar.
Military operations over the past several months have been grueling, slow, and bloody. It has been a time for readjustments, training, and fortification. New offensives will commence soon. Wherever the blow lands, and whoever strikes first, is yet to be revealed. What can be said for sure is that Ukraine has not yet seen the worst of this war.
Announced as of mid-January (although delivery timelines are not clear) western systems include 3 infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) types: American Bradley IFVs of Desert Storm fame, which are top-notch armored systems of ~90s vintage able to carry 6 soldiers + 3 crew and armed with long-range antitank missiles and an autocannon (like a machine gun, only it fires intermediary 20mm rounds somewhere between a big rifle bullet and a cannon/artillery shell); the slightly older German Marder IFVs, which are broadly similar to the Bradley; and Swedish CV90s, which are a bit more modern. It also includes French AMX-10RC light tanks/armored cars/self-propelled gun/armored reconnaissance vehicles, which have 6 wheels and a fairly large gun; American Strykers, which are capable medium-weight multipurpose vehicles best termed an armored personnel carrier (APC), and recently Challenger 2 main battle tanks from the UK, which are also not quite state of the art but are still extremely solid tanks.
To laypeople, these all might look like tanks (and the Challenger is absolutely one) no matter what they're called, and while that's an object of a LOT of discussion, it's a fair assessment. Bradleys, CV90s, and AMX-10RC in particular really blur the line, and in many ways the whole 'western countries shouldn't provide actual tanks (MBTs) because it's too provocative and escalatory' is very pedantic. To an infantryman in a trench, most of these would cause just as much trouble as a tank, although their weapons and especially their armor are nowhere near the capability of a tank.
AN: Recently (after writing this), tank deliveries were announced by several Western countries along with significant amounts of other military aid. More to come on this in a future post.
It’s impossible to overstate the usefulness of ISW maps. https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a7f6a6f5a9448496de641cf64bd375